Former Head at Payoneer Inc
- Payoneer's operating environment and pandemic impacts on volumes across the marketplace-to seller, gig economy and other B2B cross-border payment verticals
- Competitive dynamics – Payoneer vs Rapyd, dLocal, Currencycloud, Thunes, Hyperwallet, PayPal (NASDAQ: PYPL), Mastercard (NYSE: MA), Visa (NYSE: V), FleetCor (NYSE: FLT), Western Union (NYSE: WU), WorldFirst, Lianlian Pay and PingPong
- Payoneer's ability to expand beyond the core send-and-receive offering into working capital and other products
- 2021 outlook and Payoneer's potential strategic changes upon entering public markets
What is your overview of Payoneer’s operating environment, including a couple of key trends or drivers?
How would you size up the market across Payoneer’s various buckets? Would you segment it by marketplace to seller vs gig economy, or mass enterprise vs direct? How do you assess industry growth rates?
What has been the impact of coronavirus across some of Payoneer’s different segments? How might demand levels normalise for some of these different B2B cross-border payments verticals?
How do you think supply chains could evolve long term? Are there any corridors that you’re particularly optimistic or pessimistic about?
Who does Payoneer compete with, and in which segments?
What do you think is unique about Payoneer’s offering around its product or go-to-market strategy that could lead to a competitive edge? Alternatively, is there no competitive moat?
What’s your outlook for Payoneer in China? We’ve heard reports that merchants there tend to be more price-sensitive, perhaps working with multiple providers and willing to switch based on whoever is giving them the lowest rate. How would you describe the competitive dynamics there? What’s your outlook for pricing in China?
Could you estimate a loose percentage of the GMV or revenue that’s exposed to price-sensitive China-based merchants selling on Amazon?
How could players monetise customers through other solutions? Is it through working capital, merchant acquiring and other measures? Who do you think is best positioned to serve all those other ancillary offerings?
Which players would you expect to be market share gainers or market share losers over the next 3-5 years across the US and China?
Would you expect pricing pressure outside China as competition heats up? If so, which other markets do you think are most susceptible to price competition?
You mentioned Payoneer was more expensive on lending vs offerings from players such as Amazon. Do you think that its lending products can ever sufficiently compete with the marketplaces themselves? If I’m on Amazon, I have access to troves of data that will help me underwrite these merchants and better underwrite risk. Could Payoneer ever be successful competing against that?
Do you think that there’s a risk of new entrants coming to the market, perhaps better capitalised peers or other payments industry incumbents who are building out their cross-border and B2B offerings? If so, who? How would that change the competitive dynamics?
From its investor presentation, Payoneer seems to consider its peers to be high-growth payment companies such as PayPal or Square and e-commerce facilitators such as Shopify. Do you think those are actually relevant peers, or not? Where do you think Payoneer fits in this market?
What do you think are the typical selection criteria for customers selecting a vendor, whether that be mass enterprise vs direct customers or SMBs? Would a customer consider factors such as price or quality of offering? How would you rank Payoneer vs competition on those criteria?
Do you have any additional commentary around Payoneer’s positioning or potential trajectory?
Which other verticals would you expect Payoneer to be interested in? What are some of the key hurdles that it might need to clear?
What is your opinion on the strengths and weaknesses of Payoneer’s management team?
Why do you think the business would be going public through a SPAC [special-purpose acquisition company] rather than an IPO?
What do you expect around product expansion for Payoneer? We’ve discussed working capital and lending and you mentioned opportunities for ERP [enterprise resource planning], inventory management or other merchant services. There are also card growth platforms. How would you size up those opportunities? Could you assess the company’s ability to successfully extend into those lines?
Do you think there could be any M&A activity as Payoneer potentially targets extension into different products or verticals? It acquired Optile in December 2019. Do you think there could be other potential targets on the horizon?
Do you think Payoneer could be a potential acquisition target? You mentioned it seems as though that option got tabled and the company is now going public. Do you think it would make a good strategic acquisition target for one of the large corporates?
Could you outline the company’s risk and compliance framework? How does that play into the broader picture?
You mentioned WorldFirst exited the US market post-acquisition by Ant Financial in February 2019. Was that mandated, or what was the reason for it exiting the market? Is there any risk that it could potentially become a domestic competitor again?
What’s your best-, worst- and base-case outlook for Payoneer’s trajectory across the next 1-5 years?
Is there anything around Payoneer that you think is commonly misunderstood by the investment community? What should we be paying attention to around the company’s different projections?
Do you have any closing comments, or is there anything we didn’t spend enough time on?
Gain access to Premium Content
Submit your details to access up to 5 Forum Transcripts or to request a complimentary one week trial.
The information, material and content contained in this transcript (“Content”) is for information purposes only and does not constitute advice of any type or a trade recommendation and should not form the basis of any investment decision.This transcript has been edited by Third Bridge for ease of reading. Third Bridge Group Limited and its affiliates (together “Third Bridge”) make no representation and accept no liability for the Contentor for any errors, omissions or inaccuracies in respect of it. The views of the specialist expressed in the Content are those of the specialist and they are not endorsed by, nor do they represent the opinion of, Third Bridge. Third Bridge reserves all copyright, intellectual and other property rights in the Content. Any modification, reformatting, copying, displaying, distributing, transmitting, publishing, licensing, creating derivative works from, transferring or selling any Content is strictly prohibited