Specialist
Former regional head at Uber Technologies Inc
Agenda
- Food delivery service demand trends and restaurant reopening outlook
- Competitive dynamics between Uber Eats (NYSE: UBER) and Demae-Can (TYO: 2484)
- Order frequency and average basket size expansion opportunities
Questions
1.
How would you describe the penetration rate of food delivery platforms into the overall Japanese digital population?
2.
Why do you think Japan has been slower to adapt to the online food delivery model than other developed countries?
3.
To what extent do you think coronavirus has increased usage among existing users vs driven new user acquisition for online delivery platforms?
4.
Could you describe the trend in monthly order frequency and average basket size over the past 1-2 years?
5.
How have take rates trended across various restaurant categories?
6.
You mentioned that Uber Eats’ fee in Japan is around 35% of total order cost. Would you say Demae-Can is unique in having its fee sit at around 40%?
7.
How often are take rates renewed between restaurants and platforms in the Japanese market? Is this standardised across restaurant types? Do rates differ when it comes to chains?
8.
Which types of restaurant in Japan do you think have been the most vs least receptive to adapting to the online food delivery platform model?
9.
Uber Eats and Demae-Can each have over 45,000 restaurants in their portfolios across Japan. How would you say this translates into pan-country market share?
10.
Could you estimate Uber Eats and Demae-Can’s combined market share by GMV or revenue? What are the rest of the players able to take?
11.
How regionalised are the players’ competitive advantages? International players such as DoorDash began by building their footprints in smaller, less competitive cities when they entered the market. Are there any geographic areas that you think a smaller player could penetrate and build a presence from?
12.
You described selection as another very key aspect of competitive positioning. Where do you think Demae Can and Uber Eats’ strategic focuses will lie in 2021?
13.
You estimated that the top 20 restaurant brands in Japan account for 13% of overall F&B [food and beverage] industry revenue. Could you outline the key restaurants Uber Eats and Demae-Can might seek to sign in 2021?
14.
Could you compare Uber Eats and Demae-Can’s branding and target customer groups?
15.
What are your thoughts on Demae-Can’s shift towards an aggregator-based operational model that uses delivery partners? What cost advantages do you think this can provide?
16.
How do you expect CAC [customer acquisition cost] to trend over the next 1-2 years as more international players seek to enter the Japanese market? Might Demae-Can be unaffected by this because of its Line ecosystem?
17.
Could you elaborate on newer players such as Foodpanda, Woowa Brothers and Wolt? What are your thoughts on them? How do you think about long-term competition in the Japanese market, considering even DoorDash has sought to enter?
18.
Do you think the main barrier to a third player catching up to Demae-Can and Uber Eats in Japan comes from the top 20-40 restaurants not wanting to list across so many platforms? Might consumer awareness be the bigger obstacle, or consumers not wanting to have more than two delivery apps on their phones?
19.
Is there any topic that you think we’re yet to do justice to in our discussion?
20.
Could a third player challenge Demae-Can and Uber Eats by focusing on online groceries?
21.
Which metrics do you think analysts should track to understand competitive dynamics in the Japanese food delivery market, given that some international players do not disclose Japan-specific financials? What market movements could we track to assess the competition, besides relying on filings from the restaurant side?
Gain access to Premium Content
Submit your details to access up to 5 Forum Transcripts or to request a complimentary 48 hour week trial
The information, material and content contained in this transcript (“Content”) is for information purposes only and does not constitute advice of any type or a trade recommendation and should not form the basis of any investment decision.This transcript has been edited by Third Bridge for ease of reading. Third Bridge Group Limited and its affiliates (together “Third Bridge”) make no representation and accept no liability for the Contentor for any errors, omissions or inaccuracies in respect of it. The views of the specialist expressed in the Content are those of the specialist and they are not endorsed by, nor do they represent the opinion of, Third Bridge. Third Bridge reserves all copyright, intellectual and other property rights in the Content. Any modification, reformatting, copying, displaying, distributing, transmitting, publishing, licensing, creating derivative works from, transferring or selling any Content is strictly prohibited
