Specialist
Former senior executive at Aston Martin Lagonda Global Holdings plc
Agenda
- Ferrari’s (NYSE: RACE) volume outlook by model and region, highlighting key growth drivers including SUV launch expectations
- Pricing growth opportunities across models and impacts on ASPs
- Challenges associated with EVs’ (electric vehicles’) growth and Ferrari’s opportunity in this market
- Margin outlook, considering supply chain bottlenecks and cost pressures
Questions
1.
What’s your 2022 volume growth outlook for Ferrari, particularly given the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its impact on the automotive supply chain? Volumes are obviously crucial to the brand’s growth.
2.
What are the key growth drivers in your mind when you think about Ferrari’s 12,250-12,500 models, or perhaps I should say units?
3.
What’s your outlook for Ferrari’s 2022 volume splits by region? I think this is broken down across EMEA, China, the rest of APAC and Americas.
4.
How do you expect current lockdowns to impact demand for Ferrari in China’s market?
5.
Is there scope for Ferrari to catch up towards the back end of 2022 if we do see a prolonged lockdown?
6.
You mentioned a decrease in regional share in the Americas vs historical levels. Why do you think this is?
7.
What model mix split are you expecting in 2022?
8.
Do you think the Ferrari brand has the correct positioning in China based on the 2022 model mix or roll-out plan? This is such a key market.
9.
What’s your 2023-25 volume outlook?
10.
If we assume 15,000-15,500 units in 2023, what would be the Purosangue’s potential contribution?
11.
Why do you think Ferrari can’t achieve similar volumes to Lamborghini without a hybrid?
12.
Why doesn’t Ferrari bring the mild hybrids to market earlier?
13.
You mentioned Ferrari is behind the game, and I think that’s clear based on the number of SUVs already present in the market. What’s led to the company’s slow response to the SUV boom and bringing out its own SUV?
14.
Who do you think is the Ferrari SUV customer?
15.
Is there an opportunity for Ferrari to take customers from Lamborghini or any of the sector’s other luxury players who already have an SUV?
16.
Residual values have obviously been a key growth driver for Ferrari in the past. Do you expect these to be as resilient for the SUV?
17.
Why do you think the SUV could have a stronger residual value, or why is it stronger at Lamborghini?
18.
You mentioned the Daytona SP3’s launch, another model that could at least drive profitability. What volume contribution are you expecting from this Icona?
19.
Do you think the SP3 addresses the concerns or struggles encountered by the SP1 and SP2?
20.
What’s the argument around the iconic or specials across luxury auto OEMs [original equipment manufacturers] reaching a point of fatigue with customers?
21.
The specials obviously have a key impact on Ferrari’s ASP. What price mix shifts are you expecting in 2022, given the phase-out of the SP1 and SP2?
22.
How much pricing headroom do you think there is on future models for Ferrari?
23.
How confident are you in Ferrari’s ability to pass on raw material costs, labour inflation or any additional inflation to the customer?
24.
What increase do you think is required to offset additional costs in 2022? This cost inflation could be in raw material, labour or other supply chain areas.
25.
What opportunities are there to incrementally increase the price on existing models?
26.
How much pricing headroom is there in the Ferrari brand for the full face lifts we see within the model lifecycle?
27.
You mentioned the supply shortage being key, and as you say, I think Ferrari has benefited from stable supply throughout the semiconductor crisis. We’re seeing a different challenge now with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the impact on wire harnesses. How confident are you that Ferrari can maintain supply, similar to how it dealt with the semiconductor shortage?
28.
We’ve discussed Ferrari’s volumes and the price mix effect. How do these factors impact the company’s revenue growth, particularly in 2022?
29.
How do you think the shift to EVs [electric vehicles] impacts Ferrari’s phenomenal growth story?
30.
How do you create brand heat or retain the brand halo as you shift to EVs, where an engine is no longer the driving factor?
31.
How do you expect the mix across electric, synthetic and traditional petrol cars to look in 5-10 years?
32.
How material would you expect synthetic to actually be for Ferrari?
33.
How important do you see synthetic fuels being for the competitive landscape?
34.
Where does hydrogen place in the mix?
35.
How important is technology in driving differentiation? You mentioned brand design and fuel strategy as some key drivers.
36.
What key improvements do you think are needed in infotainment? What are the current key drawbacks?
37.
How important is infotainment for driving differentiation in EVs?
38.
How do you think EV growth impacts the competitive landscape for Ferrari?
39.
Does EV growth change the mix of competitors? We’re seeing growth in Tesla and Lucid.
40.
We’re also seeing increased JVs across the auto sector as OEMs try to tackle the EV shift. What do you think is the correct approach for Ferrari, which has so often prided itself on insourcing?
41.
Could acquiring companies in the sector be a way of in-housing?
42.
You mentioned Ferrari’s CAPEX bill, roughly EUR 700m-750m per year over the last few years. Is this sustainable as the company shifts to EVs?
43.
What’s your 2022 margins outlook for Ferrari? We’ve discussed challenges around the price mix effect and raw material inflation.
44.
How do SUV margins typically differ to sport or GT [grand tourer] vehicles at the market-level?
45.
How do EVs impact Ferrari’s long-term EBIT margin profile?
46.
You mentioned the BOM [bill of materials] and production costs. What about pricing, an obvious key driver of margins? How resilient could prices be within the EV mix?
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